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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
In this Brief, the Plaintiff and Appellant will be
referred to as Gateway, The Defendant Nixon & Nixon, Inc. will
be referred to as Nixon, and the Defendant: E. J. Nixon, Jr.
will be referred to as E.J.

A principal party to the chain of

events leading to this case is John New & Associates, Inc.,
hereinafter referred to as New.
appeal will be designated "R".
the trial will be designated

lf ff

References to the record on
References to the Transcript of

T .

References to the transcript

of the Gateway Motion to Re-open will be designated "MTR".

All

emphasis is added.

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
Original jurisdiction is conferred upon the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah pursuant to Section 78-2-2(3)(i), Utah
Code Annotated 1953, as supplemented and amended.

The Supreme

Court exercised its discretion to transfer the appeal to the
Utah Court of Appeals in accordance with Rule 4A of the Rules
of the Utah Supreme Court and pursuant to Section 78-2-2(4),
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as supplemented and amended.

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW
The suit below was on a promissory no te.
tried to a jury.

The case was

At the close of Gateway* s case and after

Gateway had rested, Nixon and E.J. moved f or dismissal of
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Gateway's Complaint for failure of Gateway to prove that it
was the owner and holder of the note sued upon.
was granted.

This motion

This holding was affirmed on Gateway1s motion to

re-open and for re-hearing.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Two (2) issues are presented to this Court for review.
They are:
1.

Did Gateway prove at the trial by a preponderance of

the evidence that it was the owner and holder of the Promissory
Note sued upon.
2.

If Gateway proved at the trial by a preponderance of

the evidence that it was the owner and holder of the Promissory
Note sued upon, did Gateway prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that said Promissory Note was due and payable.

APPLICABLE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ETC.
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes,
ordinances, rules or regulations whose provisions are
determinative of this case.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case was tried to a jury in the District Court of
Salt Lake County on February 4, 1987, the Honorable Frank G.
Noel presiding.

The suit by Gateway is to enforce payment
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of a promissory note. When Gateway rested its case, Nixon
and E.J. moved to dismiss Gateway's Compla lint on the ground
that Gateway had not proven that it was th b owner and holder of
(T. 20, lines 21 and 22)

the Note, and the motion was granted.

The Court reduced its Order of Dismissal to writing on February
18, 1987.

(R. 104) On February 27, 1987, Gateway moved to

alter or amend the Order of Dismissal.

(R . 106) This motion

was heard and denied on October 9, 1987.

(MTR. 32, lines 21-25

and R. 133) This appeal followed Judge Noel's denial of
Gateway's Motion to Alter or Amend Order of Dismissal.
On November 20, 1978, New as Seller and Nixon as Buyer
entered into a written Agreement for the sale and purchase of
real property in Weber County, Utah.

(MTR

5) A copy of this

Agreement is appended to this Brief and wi| 1 be referred to
hereinafter as the New-Nixon Agreement.
New refused to perform the New-Nixon Agreement, and as a
result Nixon filed suit against New in the District Court of
Weber County for specific performance.

Judge Calvin Gould

presided over this trial and ruled in favor of New. The
decision of Judge Gould was appealed to thi Utah Supreme
Court and there was reversed.

(Nixon & Nixon, Inc. vs. John

New & Associates, Inc., 641 P.2d 144) A cipy of the Utah
Supreme Court's Decision in the Nixon-New c^ase is appended to
this Brief.

-3-

The New-Nixon Agreement requires Nixon to execute a Note
to New.

(Paragraph 9)

On remand from the Supreme Court, the

District Court of Weber County decreed specific performance of
the New-Nixon Agreement.

Pursuant to this decree, the

Promissory Note sued upon by Gateway was given by Nixon to New
on December 30, 1983.

(See Ex. 21-P and particularly the last

paragraph on page 2 which states:

"This note is given pursuant

to the terms of a Judgment and Decree of the Honorable Calvin
Gould entered December 26, 1983 in Civil Case #72745 in the
District Court of Weber County, Utah, to which Judgment and
Decree reference is made for the terms, provisions and
conditions thereof.")

The Nixon to New Note was admitted as

Exhibit 21-P in the trial.

A copy of the Nixon to New Note is

appended to this Brief and will be referred to hereinafter as
"the NoteM.
In March 1986, Plaintiff filed suit against Nixon and E.J.
in the District Court of Salt Lake County, alleging the
execution of the Note and that:
,f

5. All conditions and conditions precedent have
been performed or have occurred, or the performance or
occurrence thereof has been waived and defendants are
estopped from demanding or requiring their performance
or ocurrence;"
"6. On January 22, 1984, said agreement was duly
assigned to the plaintiff and plaintiff is the present
owner and holder thereof.tf (R. 2 and 3)
Nixon and E.J. denied the allegations in paragraph 5 and 6
of Gateway's Complaint.

(R. 11) Thereafter, Gateway amended
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its Complaint to change the specific date of the purported
assignment to it of the Note to April 21, 1980.

(R. 56,

paragraph 6) The amended allegation was likewise denied by
Nixon and E.J.

(R. 62, paragraph 6)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

Nixon and E.J. contend that the Ndte is non-negotiable

and that Gateway failed to prove at the trial that the Note had
been transferred or assigned to Gateway, and that failing in
such proof, Gateway was not the owner and folder of the Note
and was not, therefore, entitled to sue on the Note.
2.

The Note by its terms is payable f1 ... six months after

the maker (Nixon) files a final subdivision plat ..." against
the property subject of the New-Nixon Agree ment.

If not paid

then, the Note begins to accrue interest at| eight percent (8%)
and the principal and interest on the Note |are due four years
after the filing of said subdivision plat,
paragraphs 1, 2 and 3)

(See Ex. 21-P,

Plaintiff failed tol prove at the trial

that the subdivision plat has ever been filed or waived by
Nixon, and without such proof, there is no evidence the Note
was due when sued upon or at all.

ARGUMENT
1.

DID GATEWAY PROVE AT THE TRIAL Bff A PREPONDERANCE OF

THE EVIDENCE THAT IT WAS THE OWNER AND HOLDER
OF THE PROMISSORY
r£
NOTE SUED UPON.
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The Note is non-negotiable.

The elements required to make

an instrument negotiable are set forth in 70A-3-104, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953 as amended, as follows:
"(1)

Any writing to be a negotiable instrument within
this chapter must
(a) be signed by the maker or drawer; and
(b) contain an unconditional promise or order to
pay a sum certain in money and no other
promise, order, obligation or power given by
the maker or drawer except as authorized by
this chapter; and
(c) be payable on demand or at a definite time; and*
(d)

be payable to order or to bearer."

The Note fails the test of 70A-3-104, Utah Code Annotated,
1953, in the following particulars:
(a) The Note does not "contain an unconditional promise to
pay a sum certain."

The Note is for $53,071.27 and provides

that from this sum the maker (Nixon) can offset (1) amounts
necessary to remove liens from the property described in the
Note, (2) the costs of clearing title to the said property, andv
(3) the cost to Nixon of performing covenants to be performed
by New under the terms of the New-Nixon Agreement.
paragraphs A, B and C)

(Ex. 21-P,

The amount due on the Note cannot

therefore be certain until the amounts of the offsets are
determined.

In addition, there is a condition to the payment

of the Note, to-wit:

the filing of a subdivision plat.

The Note is not, therefore, an "unconditiohal order or
promise to pay."
(b) The Note is not payable "to orderl or bearer."

The

Note is payable "to John New & Associates,! Inc., a Utah
Corporation."

(Ex. 21-P, paragraph 1)

In its Amended Complaint, Gateway alleged that, "On April
21, 1980 said agreement (the Note) was duly assigned to the
Plaintiff ..." (R. 57)
E.J. in their Answer.

This allegation was denied by Nixon and
(R. 63, paragraph 6 )

This denial put

the burden on Gateway to prove the assignment.
Gateway undertook to prove the assignment to it of the
Note by introducing three (3) exhibits.

The first was Ex.

20-P, which on its face is an assignment of
property as therein described from New to Gateway.
is made in the assignment of the Note.

No mention

A popy of this

Assignment is appended to this Brief.
Gateway also attempted to offer two (jf) Quit Claim Deeds,
one as Ex. 19-P and the other as Ex. 29-P.
objected to and the objection sustained.
15)

Ex. 19-P was
(T. 6, lines 14 and

No further attempts were made to have |it admitted.

29-P was objected to and its admission refused.
16-18)

Ex.

(T. 9, lines

There was no other evidence presen

the Note had been assigned to it as allege^ in paragraph 6 of
its Amended Complaint.
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The only other evidence on the ownership of the Note by
Gateway was this testimony of Carl Lee Gall, President of
Gateway:
"Q.

(By Mr. Hunt)

Did you receive that Promissory

Note from John New & Associates when it was delivered to
them?
"A.

Yes.

ff

(By Mr. Hunt) You did receive that from John

Q.

(T. 7, lines 17-19)

New & Associates?
...

"A.

Yes.

(T. 8, lines 1-7)

Gateway did not argue at the trial that it was the owner
of the Note by any means other than the assignment (Ex. 20-P)
or the proferred and refused Quit Claim Deeds (Exs. 19-P and
29-P).

In its Brief, Gateway argues that the mere fact Gateway

had possession of the Note vested legal title to the Note in
Gateway.

(Appellant's Brief, page 5)

It is admitted that there is dicta in Utah cases to the
effect that a non-negotiable note may be assigned by parol.
However, even under such dicta, there must be some parol
evidence to show the assignment.

In this case, there was none.

Gateway's sole evidence of ownership of the Note was its
possession of the same.
obtained such possession.

It offered no evidence as to how it
Gateway alleged a specific

assignment, giving the exact date thereof, to-wit:
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April 21,

1980.

(R. 56, paragraph 6)

Nixon and E.Jl denied this

allegation, thereby putting Gateway on its proof of the
allegation.

Gateway offered no proof of t$e alleged

assignment.
The rule of law on parol assignments is stated thusly in
10 C.J.S. on Bills and Notes §227:
"A valid assignment may be made by woitds or acts which
fairly indicate an intention to make the assignee the
owner. Such assignment may be in writing, and formal or
informal, but it must show, in some manner, a making over
of the right or interest therein a£ distinguished from a
mere delivery of possession.'1
and in 11 Am. Jur. 2nd on Bills and Notes §275, it is
stated, "But there is more to delivery than merely parting with
possession; there must also be the intention to give effect to
the instrument."
In Leverett v. Awnings Inc., (GA) 104 SE 2nd 686, the
Court held there must be intention to pass title.
The Oregon Supreme Court in Schumann v. Bank of
California, N.A., 233 P. 860, held that assignment of a
non-negotiable chose in action may be affected by assent of the
assignor and assignee, accompanied by delivery of the chose in
action.
389 P.2d 760,
Midstate Homes, Inc. v, Hockenberger, (Kan)
I
and Glenn v. Lukenbill, (Kan) 389 P.2d 792, cited by Gateway at
page 5 of its Brief, are inappropriate as both cases dealt with
negotiable instruments, whereas the Note in| this case is
non-negotiable.

Clearly a negotiable note is transferable by
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delivery without endorsement.

(70A-3-202(1), Utah Code

Annotated, 1953 as amended and supplemented)

In both the

Hockenberger and Lukenbill (supra.), the assignment was in fact
in writing and the statements therein that an assignment could
be by parol are dicta.

Moreover, even if the dicta is accepted

as the law of the case, the ruling does not obviate the
requirement of proving the oral assignment.
The cases of Thatcher et al. v. Merriam et al., (Ut) 240
P.2d 266, Johnson v. Beickey, (Ut) 43 P. 189, and O'Conner v.
Slatter, (Ut) 93 Pac. 1078, cited by Gateway at pages 6 and 7
of its Brief, are not dispositive of this case.

These three

(3) cases recite as dicta that a note may be asssigned by
parol.

However, in all three (3) cases, there was, in fact, a

written assignment of the notes in question.

The statement is

repeated in Am. Jur. 2nd on Bills, Notes, in the Utah case of
Thatcher (ibid.) and in various other cases that a
non-negotiable note may be transferred by parol.

But counsel

has been unable to find a single case where a court has
actually considered a non-negotiable note assigned without a
written endorsement or assignment in support of the proposition
that a non-negotiable note can be assigned by parol.

In short,

the dicta that a non-negotiable note can be transferred by
parol does not appear to be supported by any case law where
there was in fact no written endorsement or assignment.

On the

other hand, in the case of Ball v. Hill, (Tex) 38 Tex. 237, the
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Texas Supreme Court held that "possession df a
non-negotiable note, without a written assijgnment, is no
evidence of ownership/1

Assuming arguendo that the dicta in

Thatcher, Johnson and 0'Conner (supra.) in fact stands for the
proposition that a non-negotiable note can be transferred by
parol, there is still the requirement that the assignment by
parol be proven.

The point in this case isl not just whether a

non-negotiable note can be transferred by parol and without
written endorsement or assignment, but whether there was any
parol evidence (or any evidence of any kind for that matter)
that there was an assignment of the Note from New to Gateway.
Gateway alleged assignment to it of the Note on a specific
date, to-wit:

April 21, 1980. The assignment was denied by
This denial1 put Gateway on its

Nixon and E.J. in their Answer.

proof of the allegation by a preponderance of the evidence.
Gateway failed to prove that by parol or otherwise on the date
of the alleged assignment, to-wit: April 2 1, 1980, or at all,
New assigned the Note to Gateway.

It is si[gnificant that the

assignment, which is Ex. 20-P, is dated Aprjil 21, 1980, the
date Gateway alleges the Note was assigned to it, and it is
apparent that Gateway relies on this assignment to establish
its ownership of the Note.

If not, why did Gateway not simply

put on parol or other evidence of the assignment to it of the
Note?

One can only conclude it was because there was not other

evidence of such an assignment.

And the as ^ignment which is
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Ex. 20-P is clearly not an assignment of the Note.

It is

an assignment of real property and makes no reference whatever
to the Note or any other chose in action.
Nixon and E.J. submit there was no evidence of the
assignment of the Note to Gateway, written or parol; that
Gateway therefore failed in its burden of showing ownership of
the Note, and failing to show ownership of the Note, Gateway
had no right to sue thereon.

2.

IF GATEWAY PROVED AT THE TRIAL BY A PREPONDERANCE OF

THE EVIDENCE THAT IT WAS THE OWNER AND HOLDER OF THE PROMISSORY
NOTE SUED UPON, DID GATEWAY PROVE BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE
EVIDENCE THAT SAID PROMISSORY NOTE WAS DUE AND PAYABLE•

The Note states on its face as follows:
"1. The principal amount of this Note shall be paid
six months after the Maker hereof files a final subdivision plat for the following described property in Weber
County, Utah:
(here follows legal description)
"2. In the event this Note is not paid within six
(6) months after filing of the aforesaid subdivision plat,
the amount remaining unpaid on the date six (6) months
after filing said subdivision plat shall bear interest
from and after the date six (6; months after filing said
subidivision plat at the rate of Eight percent (8%; per
annum until paid.
ff

3. Any amounts of principal and interest not sooner
paid on this Note within four (4) years after filing the
aforesaid subdivision plat shall be due on a date four (4)
years after filing said subdivision plat and if not then
said Payee may proceed according to law." (Ex. 21-P)
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In its Amended Complaint, Gateway alleged that:
"5. All conditions and conditio ns precedent which
would render said agreement due and payable have been
performed or have occurred, or the pe rformance or
occurrence thereof has been waived an a defendants are
estopped from demanding or requiring |their performance or
occurrence;" (R. 57)
This allegation was denied by Nixon and E.J.

(R. 63,

paragraph 6) This denial put Gateway on i |ts proof by a
preponderance of the evidence that (1) all conditions precedent
have been performed or occurred, or (2) that performance of
such conditions have been waived, or (3) tnat Nixon is estopped
from demanding or requiring this performance.
Gateway did not put on any evidence tnat a subdivison plat
had ever been filed on the property described in the Note.
Gateway did not put on any evidence that the filing of the
subdivision plat had been waived by Nixon and E.J.

Gateway did

not put on any evidence that would show Ni
requiring performance of the conditions precedent, to-wit:
filing of the subdivision plat.
proving the Note was due.

the

Gateway h^td the burden of

It is axiomate that there is no

cause of action on a note until it is due.

70A-3-122(l), Utah

Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, provides that f,A cause of
action against a maker ... accrues (a) in the case of a time
instrument on the day after maturity.ff Galteway failed in its
burden of proving the Note even matured and had no cause of
action on the Note until ". . . the day after it matured.11
(70A-3-122(l), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 ai amended)
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It should be noted that this point was not raised in
argument to the Trial Court. The reason for such failure was
that the Trial Court dismissed Gateway's Complaint on Nixon and
E.J.'s first argument, making it moot to raise the second
argument.

However, if this Court for any reason finds

Gateway's action should not have been dismissed for the reasons
argued in point 1 of this Brief, this Court can and should find
that Gateway, after presenting all of its evidence and resting,
did not prove the condition precedent to the Note being due and
Gateway did not therefore prove its cause of action.

CONCLUSION
Gateway put on no evidence of the Note being assigned to
it.

Had there been such evidence, it surely would have been

offered by Gateway.

The assignment, Ex. 20-P, was not evidence

the Note had been assigned by New to Gateway and is the only
evidence offered by Gateway that the Note was assigned to it.
And in any event, even if the Note was assigned to it as
alleged, Gateway failed to prove the condition precedent to the
Note being due, to-wit:

the recording of the subdivision plat

or the waiver by Nixon of this condition, by a preponderance of
the evidence, or at all. The dismissal of Gateway's case was
proper and should be affirmed by this Court.
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DATED this 7th day of July, 1988.
Respectfully submitted,
OLSON & HOGGAN

L. Brent Ho
Attorneys f
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ET Brent Ho^gan
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EXHIBIT A

A G R E E M - E N ' T

Agreement made this 10 day of November, 1978, between
JOHN NEW and ASSOCIATES, INC., a Utah corporation, hereinafter
referred to as Seller and NIXON and NIXON INC., a Utah corporation, hereinafter referred to as Buyer.
RECITALS
1.

Seller has right title and interest to certain rea

property described more particularly in Exhibit M.AH, made a
part'hereof by this reference.
2.

Buyer desires to purchase the same for the purpose

of building a subdivision.
Now therefore it is agreed and covenanted between
the parties as follows:
1.

Buyers will pay the redemption price necessary to

redeem the property and interest of John New and Associates in
the approximate sum of Seventy Six Thousand Nine Hundred
Twenty Eight Dollars and Seventy-Three Cents ($76<928 .73).
2.

Buyer shall convey to Seller title to the describe

property, free and clear of all liens and shall provide for
Buyer a policy of title insurance, insuring the title of
Buyer.
3.

Buyer shall use best efforts to prepare a sub-

division plat and proceed with engineering and development of
the property at a commercially reasonable speed.
4.

Six months from the filing of the final plat,

Buyer shall pay to Seller the difference between the redemption
price paid initially and One Hundred and Thirty Thousand Dollar
($130,000.00) .
5.

In the event, it becomes necessary to fence or

realign the millstream creek, in order to meet F.H.A. standards
and approval for funding, such realignment or fencing will be
EXHBIT "A"

7
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done by Seller at Seller's expense or if Seller is unible to
do the necessary work within Thirty days from written notice,
Buyer may do work and deduct the expense from the purchase
price.
6.

In the event, any assessments, liens or encumbrances

that exist or are subsequently disclosed to exist at the time of
this agreement that necessitate uxtia payments from Buyer to
develop the subdivision, such sums shall be deducted from the
balance of the purchase price owed Seller by Buyer.
7.

Buyer shall make all normal improvements and meet

all normal improvement costs, associated with development of
the property.
8.

In the event, Buyer does not pay Seller t|he amount

of money due and payable six months from the filing of| the final
subdivision plat, the amount of money then due and owi|ng shall
bear interest at the rate of Eight percent (8^).
9.

Buyer shall execute a note in favor of Selller

consistant with the terms of this agreement.

In the event,

Buyer has not paid the Seller the amounts due and payable here
under within four years from the filing of final

plat,

the note

shall be in default and Seller may proceed according to law
10.

The Buyer has the option to require Selle^r to

purchase the 2.45 acres described in exhibit "A" as parcel two,
at the sum of Fifteen Thousand r j ve Hundred Eighty N m e | Dollars
and Eight Two Cents ($15,589.82).

This sum represents|the re-

purchase price of the 2.45 acres.

It is the intent of|the

parties that the option to require Seller to rebuy shall bear
the identica1 price per acre that Buyer pays to Seller!

In

the event, there are adjustments in the purchase price due to
expenses incurred with realignment or fencing of the mjllstream
creek, or in the event, there are unknown liens or assessments/
these adjustments are to be reflected in the price required of
Seller for repurchasing the 2.45 acres.

Buyer must exdrcise

this right within six months after filing of the tinal plat.

JL.
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11.

In the event, Buyer sells' the property, the note to

Seller will become due and payable.
12.

It is t h e i n t e n t o f t h e p a r t i e s to m e e t F . H . A .

requirements for financing.

If there are any extraordinary

F.H.A. requirements beyond Ogden City requirements, Seller
may be required to pay these additional costs up to Seven
Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($7, !>00.00) .

In the event,

Buyer determines the development is untenable, Buyer may requin
Seller to rebuy the property for One Hundred Thousand Dollars
($100^000.00).
13.

Time is of the essence to this agreement.

DATED this 2 0 day of November, 1978.
NIXON and NIXON INC.,

B

iU8

r>^>^
!

K. J. Ni>»n
JOHN NEW and ASSOCIATES

HK'XLJL
John New, President
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF WERI2R

)
: os
J

On the 20 day of November, 1978, personally appeared
before me John New, who being duly sworn did say that he is the
President of John New and Associates and that said instrument
was signed in behalf of said John New and Associates, by
authority of its bylaws and said John New acknowledged to mo
that said John New and Associates executed the same.

(

-'7

t'

/'

<

NOTARY PUDLIC
' s"
/
R e s i d i n g aL :.' f '-/•'. - y <•(<
My Commission Expire:;: $/(i /)?r
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STAn: 01 in AH

)

COUNTY OF WLULK

)

On the
before me

day of November , 1978, personally appeared
E. J. Nixon

, who beiny ddly sworn did

say that he is an otticer of N J X O M and Nixon Inc., and that
said instrumonL was signed in bch.il £ ot .said Nixon and Nixon
Inc., by authority of its bylaws and said

U. J. Nixon

acknowledcjed to me that said Nixon dnd Nixon Inc I, executed
the same.

NOTARY PUBLIC

71 *

Uotudmq at: / # ,/
f ft'
My Commission L x p i r e s : <l/"
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UXHiBIT A

PARCEL 1,1
Part of the Southwest Quarter of Section 17, and the Southeast Quarter of
Section 18, Township 6 North, Range I West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian,
U.S, Survey! Beginning at a point on Ogden City Coordinates North 209+99.**9,
East ^5>90.^5 on the East right-of-way line of .the Oregon Short Line Railroad,
said point given as 13.30 chains West and 79.2 feet North of the* Southeast
corner of said Section 18; and running thence North 1°3Q' East 620,00 feet and
North 0°29'30M East ¥*6.**3 feet along said railroad right-of-way to Ogden City
Coordinates North 220*65.85, East ^5>92.52 (being the centerline of 7th Street
extended), thence South 89 09 , ^5" East 809.38 feet to the East line of Section
18 (Ogden City Coordinates North 220+67.68, East 5^01.97), thence South 0°50 , 15 M
West 33 feet; thence South 89°09 , ^5 M East 198.0 feet; thence South 0°58 , 30 M West
822.73 feet to a fence corner; thence North 6^°00' West 718.19 feet; thence South
25°09 , 15" West 282.80 feet along fence; thence South 3°35 , 09' West 258.05 feet;
thence North 89°17,t*9M West 231.0 feet to the point of beginning.

PARCEL 2t
Part of the Southeast Quarter of Section 18, Township 6 North, Range 1 West, Salt
Lake Meridian, U.S. Surveyt Beginning at a point North 0°58,3^« East 11*0.57 feet
and North 89 09fi*5M West ^$5.1* feat from the Southeast corner of said Quarter Section; Mr\d running thence North 89 09'^5" West 353.98 feet to the East line of Orqgon
Shortline Railroad right-of-wayj thence North along said right-of-way line ^55 feet,
more or less, to the center of Mill Creek; thence South 6^°53* East 88.8 feet along
said center of Mill Creek; thence Southeasterly alonrj a channel of said Mill Creek
to the point of beginning.

*
-20-
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[7, 8] Appellant argues that she was not
bound to perform because the closing was
not held on the September 1, 1980, date
fixed in the earnest money agreement
The general rule with regard to contracts
for the sale of land is that time is not of the
essence unless the parties expressly indicate
otherwise or the circumstances surrounding
the transaction necessarily imply that the
parties intended timeliness of performance
to be of paramount concern. Hing Bo Gum
v. Nakamura, 57 Hawaii 39, 549 P.2d 471
(1976); Ficke v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., Alaska, 524 P.2d 271, 277-78 & n. 4 (1974);
Russell v. Ferrell, 181 Kan. 259. 311 P.2d
347 (1957); Dillard v. Ceaser, 206 Okla. 304.
243 P.2d 356 (1952); Loyd v. Southwest
Underwriters, 50 N.M. 66, 169 P.2d 238
(1946). In this case, the record contains no
evidence that the parties intended time to
be of the essence in the performance of the
earnest money agreement. The terms of
the agreement do not so state, such as by
requiring a forfeiture of the deposit or an
avoidance of the contract if the deadline
were not met. Appellant makes no showing that she would have suffered irreparable harm if the property were not closed on
the stated date. Indeed, her own delaying
actions indicate otherwise.
[9] Parties to a contract are obliged to
proceed in good faith and to cooperate in
the performance of the contract in accordance with its expressed intent One party
cannot by willful act or omission make it
impossible or difficult for the other to perform and then invoke the other's nonperformance as a defense. Ferris v. Jennings,
Utah, 595 P.2d 857, 859 (1979); Zions Properties, Inc. v. Holt, Utah, 538 P.2d 1319,
1321 (1975). The court did not err in requiring appellant to execute the documents
necessary to close the sale or in later authorizing another to do so.
The orders appealed from are affirmed.
Costs to respondent
HALL, C. J., STEWART and HOWE, and
RONALD 0 . HYDE. District Judge, concur.

NIXON AND NIXON, I N C Plaintiff
and Appellant,
v.
JOHN NEW ft ASSOCIATES, I N C
Defendant and Respondent
No. 16989.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Jan. 28, 1982.

Purchaser filed an action seeking specific performance of a contract to purchase
real estate. The Second District Court,
Weber County, Calvin Gould, J., found that
the contract was too vague for specific performance. Appeal was taken. The Supreme Court, Stewart, J., held that the failure to specify the time for performance by
the vendor did not render the contract too
vague to be specifically enforced in favor of
the purchaser.
Reversed and remanded.

1. Contracts «=» 147(1)
Contracts are to be consumed in light
of reasonable expectations of parties as evidenced by purpose and language of contract.
2. Contracts *»9(1)
Contract need not provide for every
collateral matter or possible contingency.
3. Specific Performance *428(3)
Failure to specify time for performance
by vendor in contract for purchase of real
estate did not preclude specific performance
in favor of purchaser since, when no time is
agreed upon, general rule requires completion within reasonable time under all circumstances, and, therefore, agreement was
sufficiently certain in its essential terms
and obligations and rights of parties were
adequately defined to support specific performance.
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L. Brent Hoggan of Olson, Hoggan &
Sorcnson, Logan, for plaintiff and appellant.

plat, "the note shall be in default and New
& Associates may proceed according to
law."

Richard Richards, Ogden, for defendant
and respondent.

New & Associates' duties were to convey
title to the described property clear of all
liens; to provide the Nixons a policy of title
insurance insuring the buyer's title; to be
responsible for the realignment or fencing
of the Millstream Creek if it proved necessary, or if the work were not done within
the specified time, to permit the Nixons to
do the work and deduct the expenses from
the purchase price. Nixons were to be responsible for any extraordinary FHA requirements beyond Ogden City requirements of up to $7,500. The contract allowed the Nixons to require John New to
repurchase the property for $100,000 in the
event the Nixons determined that development was practical.

STEWART, Justice:
Plaintiff, Nixon and Nixon, Inc. (the
"Nixons"), purchaser of real estate, sought
specific performance of a contract to purchase approximately twenty acres of undeveloped real estate located in Weber County, Utah. The trial court found the contract too vague for specific performance
without specifying which provision or provisions were faulty for that reason. Judgment was entered restoring the parties to
their status before the agreement Plaintiff appeals.
John New, seller, had previously mortgaged the property to Commercial Security
Bank. After his default on the mortgage,
the bank foreclosed the mortgage on the
property. On November 20, 1978, the last
day of the six-month redemption period,
Nixon & Nixon, Inc., a real estate development corporation, agreed to buy the property for $130,000. Jack Nixon and his father,
Ezra J. Nixon, Sr., were the principal stockholders of the plaintiff, Nixon & Nixon, Inc.
Pursuant to an agreement between the
Nixons and John New, the Nixons initially
paid the bank $76,928.73, the amount necessary to redeem defendant's foreclosed property. Also, Nixon contracted to prepare a
subdivision plat and to proceed with engineering and development of the property at
a commercially reasonable speed, to pay the
difference between the purchase price and
the redemption price six months from the
final plat filing, and to make all normal
improvements and pay all normal improvement cosU associated with the property development. If Nixon did not pay New &
Associates the amount due and payable six
months from the filing of final subdivision
plat, the money then due and owing was to
bear interest at the rate of 8%. The contract further provided that if Nixon did not
pay New & Associates the contract price
within four years from filing of the final

Jack Nixon contacted surveyors and engineers and had initial sketches drawn as
preliminary steps. As of May 1979, however, he had made no improvements on the
property. At trial he explained why development had not commenced. According to
him, the death of Ezra Nixon caused an
initial setback in the project and the onset
of the winter months created conditions not
conducive to the development and improvement of raw ground. More importantly,
the evidence established that it would be
commercially unfeasible for a buyer to subdivide and improve a raw piece of property
before clear title was tendered. Aa-of-May
1979, despite a contract term making time
of the essence, New had not tendered a
deed of clear title. That same month, Jack
Nixon discovered that New, on his own, had
begun to subdivide the property.
Jack Nixon testified he was ready, willing, and able to execute a note in accordance with the terms of the contract but
that he had not received a deed or a title
insurance policy from defendant as required
by the* contract Mr. Hughes, New's attorney, also testified that property development and the expenditure of large sums of
money could not reasonably be expected
until clear title was tendered.
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In holding for New & Associates on the
ground that the contract was too vague to
be enforceable, the court did not delineate
any specific ambiguity. The sole finding on
ambiguity is in the following language:
[t]he contract is so ambiguous that the
rights of the defendant cannot be ascertained or enforced except at the whim
or caprice of the plaintiff, and to enforce
the contract as the plaintiff now requests
would be to deprive the defendant of any
equity he may have had in the property.
[1-3] Contracts are to be construed in
light of the reasonable expectations of the
parties as evidenced by the purpose and
language of the contract A contract need
not provide for every collateral matter or
possible contingency. Reed v. Alvey, Utah,
610 P.2d 1374 (1980); Pitts v. Marsh, 222
Kan. 586, 567 P.2d 843 (1977). In the instant case, there is no claim the contract is
uncertain as to parties, subject matter, or
consideration. Failure to specify time for
performance will not preclude specific enforcement since when no time is agreed
upon, the general rule requires completion
within a reasonable time under all circumstances. Ferris v. Jennings, Utah, 595 P.2d
857 (1979). In light of John New's failure
to tender a document of title to Jack Nixon,
there is no merit in the argument that
Nixon did not proceed in good faith in
performing the contract. Under established principles of law, the agreement was
sufficiently certain in its essential terms
and the obligations and rights of the parties
were adequately defined to support specific
performance. Reed v. Alvey, supra.
Because the only issue argued was the
vagueness of the contract, we decline to
comment on any other aspects of the controversy between the parties, and leave all
other matters to the trial court. Reversed
and remanded for further proceedings.
Costs to appellant
HALL, C. J., and HOWE and OAKS, JJ.,
concur.
MAUGHAN, J., heard arguments but
died before the opinion was filed.

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and
Respondent

Serhio H. GONZALES, Defendant
and Appellant
N(J. 17657.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Jan. 129, 1982.

Defendant was! convicted in the Second
District Court, Davis County, Douglas L.
Cornaby, J., of attempted rape on an eightyear-old minor, and he appealed. The Supreme Court held that: (1) defendant's appointed counsel was not incompetent, and
(2) other claims did not rise to degree of
prejudiciality that would warrant reversal.
Affirmed.
Howe, J., con^rred in result and filed
opinion.

1. Criminal Law

641.13(5)

Hindsight indicated that had defendant
taken his appointed counsel's advice to
plead guilty to a lesser charge involving a
lesser penalty, he 4rou!d have fared better
than he did by goin£ to trial, and record did
not otherwise show that appointed counsel,
who was fired afier he had represented
defendant for about) four months at preliminary and pretrial hearings, was incompetent
2. Criminal Law

1165(1)

Despite defendant1 s urgings that he
was denied his Fourteenth Amendment constitutional right of due process," his Sixth
Amendment right of counsel, his right to
plead "alibi" defenie and new trial, based
on newly discoverep evidence, record disclosed no error as
any alleged constitutional departures, lack of sufficient time for
preparation or assertion of alibi, and cer-
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/J/tfPROMISSORY NOTE
For value received NIXON & NIXON, INC., a Utah Corporation
agrees to pay to JOHN NEW & ASSOCIATES, INC., a Utah Corporation,
at such place as Payee may in writing direct and in lawful money
of the United States of America, the sum of $53,071.27 as
follows:
1. The principal amount of this Note shall be paid six
months after the Maker hereof files a final subdivision plat for
the following described property in Weber, County, Utah:
Part of the Southwest Quarter of Section 17, and the
Southeast Quarter of Section 18, Township 6 North, Range 1
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, U.S. Suvrey: Beginning
at a point on Ogden City Coordinates North 209+99.49, East
45+90.45 on the East right of way line of the Oregon Short
Line Railroad, said point given as 13.30 chains West and
79.2 feet North of the Southeast corner of said Section 18;
and running thence North l°30f East 620.00 feet and North
0°29 , 30 n East 446.43 feet along said railroad right of way
to Ogden City Coordinates North 220+65.85, East 45+92.52
(being the centerline of 7th Street extended), thence South
89 o 09 f 45 f, East 809.38 feet to the East line of Section 18
Ogden City Coordinates North 220+65.68, East 54+01.97),
thence South O^O'lS" West 33 feet; thence South 89o09'45"
East 198.0 feet; thence South 0°58'30" West 822.73 feet to a
fence corner; thence North 64°00f West 718.19 feet; thence
South 25°09 f 15 u West 282.80 feet along fence; thence South
3°35 , 09" West 258.05 feet; thence North 89°17 , 49 H West 231.0
feet to the point of beginning.
2. In the event this Note is not paid within six (6) months
after filing of the aforesaid subdivision plat, the amount
remaining unpaid on the date six (6) months after filing said
subdivision plat shall bear interest from and after the date six
(6) months after filing said subdivision plat at the rate of
Eight percent (8%) per annum until paid.
3. Any amounts of principal and interest not sooner paid on
this Note within four (4) years after filing the aforesaid
subdivision plat shall be due on a date four (4) years after
filing said subdivision plat and if not then said Payee may
proceed according to law:
Payee may, at its option:
A. Pay any sums necessary to remove liens and encumbrances
against the property described above, to the extent such liens
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-2and encumbrances are placed against title to said property by the
acts or neglect of Payee or those claiming by, under or through
Payee or were against title to said property on November 20,
1978, and may deduct the amount so paid from the amount of this
Note.
B. Take such action to clear title to the property
described in paragraph 1 above of liens and encumbrances of
record against said property on November 20, 1978, or placed
thereon by the acts or by reason of the neglect of Payee or those
claiming by, under or through Payee and deduct the expenses and
costs incurred by Maker in so doing from the [amount of this
Note.
C. Perform any covenant to be performed by Payee by the
terms of that certain Agreement dated Novemb^ r 20, 1978 between
Payee herein as Seller and Maker herein as Bijyer and deduct the
cost and expense of doing so from the amount of this Note.
This Note is given pursuant to the terms of a Judgment and
Decree of the Honorable Calvin Gould entered December 26
1983
in Civil Case #72745 in the District Court off Weber County, Utah,
to which Judgment and Decree reference is maq e for the terms,
provisions and conditions thereof.
DATED this 30th day of

December

1983.

NIXON & NIXOI^

INC.

C.
., President
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ASSIGNMENT
KNOW ALL, m ^ N BY THESE PRESENTS:
That the underpinned for and in consideration of the sum of
TO

and n n / 1 0 n

paid by_

: (S10.00)

=^_—

noium,

.-GA-T^WA-Y~D-EV-ELaP^l£HXXOM£ANY- .
OGDEN

of
JJXAJL

County »f.

WEBER

. , receipt whereof id hereby acknowledged, ha

ferred and by these presents do

, State of
sold, assigned, and trans-

sell, assign and transfer unto the said .GATEWAY

DEVELOPMENT COMPANY
Part o f the Southea st Quarter of Section 18, Township
6 Nort h, Ran ge 1 We st, Salt Lake Meridian, U.S. Survey:
Beginn ing at a poin t North 0°58' 34" East 1143.57 feet
and No rth 89 °09*45 H West 455.4 f eet from the Southeast
corner of sa id quar ter section; and running thence
North 89°09 f 45" Wes t 353.98 feet to the East line
of Ore gon Sh ortline Railroad Rig ht-of-way; thence
North along said Ri ght-of-Way li ne 455 feet, more
or les s, to the Cen ter of Mill C reek; thence South
64°53* East 88.8 fe et along said Center of Mill Creek;
thence South easterl y along a cha nn*l of said Mill
Creek to the point of beginning.
. have hereunto signed-. £ v

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, _ L
of

April

name. . this

**_

day

r 198Q ,

JOHN \rEW / N D ASSOCIATES ,

INC-

SECRETARY TREASURE
STATE OF_

ULA,

COUNTY OF.

.S*L

On thu

£~\ ~

.day of.

•M'rWv

1 9 * 0 . personally appeared before me

the sivn»*r_ 0 f the above instrument who duly acknowledged to me t f b t - H ^

executed the *

-B^M
Residing" at
M> A^)mmis*ion expires:

rOHM U 5 - A 4 H O N M C N T

UONG FOHM —«CCLT CO \% .

« WUTM U C

UttM
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Notary Public

